Details

    • Improvement
    • Resolution: Fixed
    • Minor
    • Lustre 2.16.0
    • Lustre 2.16.0
    • 3
    • 9223372036854775807

    Description

      We might need to support the use case of a 'local' admin, that is root on the client, also root on Lustre to achieve some tasks such as changing files' owner or group (so root squash cannot be used) but still restricted in some privileged actions (e.g. lfs commands).

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            [LU-16524] Limit capabilities of local admin
            adilger Andreas Dilger made changes -
            Link New: This issue is related to DDN-5250 [ DDN-5250 ]
            pjones Peter Jones made changes -
            Issue Type Original: Bug [ 1 ] New: Improvement [ 4 ]
            pjones Peter Jones made changes -
            Affects Version/s Original: Lustre 2.15.3 [ 15998 ]
            mdiep Minh Diep made changes -
            Remote Link New: This issue links to "Page (Whamcloud Community Wiki)" [ 31511 ]
            mdiep Minh Diep made changes -
            Affects Version/s New: Lustre 2.15.3 [ 15998 ]
            pjones Peter Jones made changes -
            Fix Version/s Original: Lustre 2.15.3 [ 15998 ]
            pjones Peter Jones made changes -
            Fix Version/s New: Lustre 2.16.0 [ 15190 ]
            Fix Version/s New: Lustre 2.15.3 [ 15998 ]
            Resolution New: Fixed [ 1 ]
            Status Original: Open [ 1 ] New: Resolved [ 5 ]
            pjones Peter Jones added a comment - - edited

            Seems like this body of work has merged for 2.16

            pjones Peter Jones added a comment - - edited Seems like this body of work has merged for 2.16

            You are right, this would be somewhat the opposite approach, with the benefit that it would "grant" select privileges to the tenant admin, starting from "nothing" that the regular user has, so would be more "fail safe". The current approach will take away privileges from a root user, but risks that something was missed, or is added in the future that does not add RBAC roles/checks and cannot be squashed/removed.

            That said, it definitely belongs in a different ticket so that this one can be marked resolved..

            adilger Andreas Dilger added a comment - You are right, this would be somewhat the opposite approach, with the benefit that it would "grant" select privileges to the tenant admin, starting from "nothing" that the regular user has, so would be more "fail safe". The current approach will take away privileges from a root user, but risks that something was missed, or is added in the future that does not add RBAC roles/checks and cannot be squashed/removed. That said, it definitely belongs in a different ticket so that this one can be marked resolved..

            Hi Andreas,

            If I understand correctly your comment in https://jira.whamcloud.com/browse/LU-16524?focusedCommentId=370402&page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel#comment-370402, that would consist in extending the capabilities of a squashed (root) user so that it can still modify file permissions and owners and quotas, if they correspond to a mapped uid/gid/projid.

            It seems to be quite the opposite idea of what we implemented with this ticket. The rbac roles are designed to limit the powers of not-squashed root, by preventing modifications of file permissions and owners (file_perms role), or quota modifications (quota_ops role) for instance.

            I am not saying that extending the capabilities of a squashed (root) user would not be an interesting feature to have. But I think it is a different approach that should be tackled under a different ticket.

            sebastien Sebastien Buisson added a comment - Hi Andreas, If I understand correctly your comment in https://jira.whamcloud.com/browse/LU-16524?focusedCommentId=370402&page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel#comment-370402 , that would consist in extending the capabilities of a squashed (root) user so that it can still modify file permissions and owners and quotas, if they correspond to a mapped uid/gid/projid. It seems to be quite the opposite idea of what we implemented with this ticket. The rbac roles are designed to limit the powers of not-squashed root, by preventing modifications of file permissions and owners ( file_perms role), or quota modifications ( quota_ops role) for instance. I am not saying that extending the capabilities of a squashed (root) user would not be an interesting feature to have. But I think it is a different approach that should be tackled under a different ticket.

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              sebastien Sebastien Buisson
              sebastien Sebastien Buisson
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